Ninth Circuit Panel Rules That Providing Return to IRS Agent Begins Statute of Limitations If Return Not Previously Filed

The IRS in 2005 sends a partnership a notice that they have no record of their 2001 income tax return being filed.  The taxpayer’s accountant, in response to the notice faxes a signed copy of the Form 1065 to the IRS at the response number in the notice along with a certified mail receipt to show timely filing. A month later the IRS began an examination of the partnership.  As part of the examination, in July 2007 the partnership’s counsel mailed another signed copy of the return and certified mail receipt to an IRS attorney.

In October of 2010, the IRS issued the partnership a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment, more than three years after the second signed copy of the tax return had been provided to IRS personnel per their requests.  While you might be thinking that the IRS is too late now, since the statute for issuing the FPAA was three years after the return was filed, the IRS argued that the FPAA was timely as the return was never filed in accordance with the regulations, so the statute never began to run.

The Tax Court agreed with the IRS,[1] finding that the taxpayer had not complied with the requirements found in Treasury Reg. §1.6031(a)-1(e)(1) as the return was not filed with the IRS Service Center designated to receive the return.  However, in a split decision with a long dissent, a Ninth Circuit panel overruled the Tax Court,[2] finding the return had been filed more than 3 years prior to the date the FPAA was issued when a copy of the return was provided to an IRS employee who had requested the return.

Filing a Tax Return

The case depends solely on what constitutes the filing of a tax return, which requires looking to the Code and Regulations first to see what they provide.

IRS §6230(i), which applied to TEFRA partnerships for 2001, provided a partnership return “shall be filed or made at such time, in such manner, and at such place as may be prescribed in regulations.”

Reg. §1.6031(a)-1(e) provides:

(e) Procedural requirements

(1) Place for filing.

The return of a partnership must be filed with the service center prescribed in the relevant IRS revenue procedure, publication, form, or instructions to the form (see section 601.601(d)(2)).

(2) Time for filing.

The return of a partnership must be filed on or before the date prescribed by section 6072(b).

(3) Magnetic media filing.

For magnetic media filing requirements with respect to partnerships, see section 6011(e)(2) and the regulations thereunder.

For 2001 the instructions for Form 1065 provided that the partnership return in question was to be filed with the Ogden Service Center of the IRS.

Facts of the Case

The case begins with the taxpayers’ filing of their 2001 return for the partnership, a filing the IRS claimed it never received:

Seaview believed it filed its partnership tax return—also known as a Form 1065—for the 2001 tax year back in July 2002. In its Form 1065 for 2001, Seaview reported a $35,459,542 loss from a tax-shelter transaction. Seaview claims it mailed the return to the IRS service center in Ogden, Utah—the correct place to send timely returns. But the IRS has no record of receiving such a filing.[3]

The first inkling the taxpayers had that the IRS did not have a record of their partnership return being filed occurred in 2005:

In July 2005, an IRS revenue agent sent Seaview a letter notifying the partnership that the IRS had not received its 2001 federal income tax return. Attached to that letter was a request to “[p]lease produce the following information and documents”:

1. Did Seaview Trading file a Form 1065 (U.S. Return of Partnership Income) or other Federal Income tax return for its taxable year 2001? If so, what type of form did it file, what service center was the return filed with, and when was the return filed?

2. Provide copies of all retained copies of the return referred to in paragraph 1, above.

3. Provide copies of all receipts and other proof of mailing of the return referred to in paragraph 1, above.[4]

The taxpayer’s accountant promptly responded to this request and provided the requested information:

In response, in September 2005, Seaview’s accountant faxed the IRS revenue agent a signed copy of Seaview’s 2001 Form 1065 return, along with the certified mail receipt purporting to show its delivery to the IRS. In the cover letter to the IRS revenue agent, Seaview’s accountant stated: “As we discussed, I have attached the 2001 tax return for Seaview Trading LLC as well as the certified mailing.”[5]

The IRS then began an examination of the partnership.  During this examination, the IRS confirmed that it had received the faxed copy of the Form 1065 from the accountant:

As part of its examination, the IRS interviewed Seaview’s accountant in January 2006. During the interview, the IRS noted that the accountant had “previously provided” Seaview’s signed 2001 tax return and introduced the Form 1065 as an exhibit. In June 2007, the IRS also interviewed Robert Kotick. Again, the IRS acknowledged that it “obtained from [Seaview’s accountant] a Form 1065 prepared for Seaview Trading, LLC, for its tax year 2001.” The IRS also entered the Form 1065 as an exhibit for the interview.[6]

As well, in July 2007 the IRS obtained yet another copy of the return in question:

In July 2007, Seaview’s counsel mailed another signed copy of the 2001 tax return to an IRS attorney “[p]ursuant to [their] prior conversation.”[7]

However, the IRS released their Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) for the partnership more than 3 years after the second copy of the return that the agency agrees it received was transmitted to the agency, holding that neither of those returns had been properly filed, thus the statute of limitations never began running:

More than three years later, in October 2010, the IRS issued Seaview a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment for the 2001 tax year. In that notice, the IRS stated that “[p]er Internal Revenue Service records, no tax return was filed by [Seaview] for 2001,” but said, “[d]uring the examination,” the partnership provided “a copy of a 2001 tax return which taxpayer claimed to have filed.” The IRS then determined that “none of the income/loss/expense amounts reflected on the 2001 unfiled tax return provided by [Seaview was] allowable.” It then informed Seaview that it would adjust its 2001 reported loss from over $35 million to zero dollars.[8]

The Tax Court Ruling – the Return Was Never Filed

The matter went to the Tax Court which had to decide if, in fact, a return was filed when the signed copy was faxed to the IRS agent.  The Tax Court analysis began by noting:

Generally, a limitations period “runs against the United States only when they assent and upon the conditions prescribed.” Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 245, 249 (1930). For a taxpayer to secure the benefit of a limitations period bar, there must be “meticulous compliance by the taxpayer with all named conditions.” Winnett v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 802, 807-808 (1991) (quoting Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U.S. at 249). One such requirement is that a return be filed at the designated place of filing returns. See id. at 808. However, if a taxpayer submits a return to the wrong place but the return is later forwarded to designated place for filing, the limitations period commences when the return is received at the designated place for filing. See id.[9]

The Tax Court found that no return ever made its way to the Ogden Service Center:

Section 1.6031(a)-1(e)(1), Income Tax Regs., designates the proper place to file a Federal partnership income tax return. The designated place for filing is the “service center prescribed in the relevant IRS revenue procedure, publication, form, or instructions to the form”. The instructions for Form 1065 for 2001 state that the proper service center for filing was the Ogden, Utah, service center. Thus, Seaview did not submit a return to the proper place for filing when it faxed a copy to Agent Johnson in 2005 or when it sent a copy to respondent’s counsel in 2007. Neither of the purported returns was forwarded to the Ogden service center. Additionally, there is a plethora of caselaw holding that a revenue agent is not a designated filing place. W.H. Hill Co. v. Commissioner, 64 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1933), aff’g 22 B.T.A. 1351 (1931) and 23 B.T.A. 605 (1931); Green v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-152, 1993 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 154, at *20, aff’d, 33 F.3d 1378 (5th Cir. 1994); see Metals Ref., Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-115, 1993 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 113, at *20-*21.[10]

The Tax Court also distinguished this case from a criminal case where the return was given to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agent:

With respect to Seaview's faxing of the return, petitioner maintains that the Internal Revenue Manual requires revenue agents to process delinquent returns that they receive. In support, petitioner relies on Dingman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-116, 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 112. Dingman is inapplicable to the present case. In Dingman, we held, in a unique factual situation, that a taxpayer filed his returns when his counsel provided delinquent returns to the IRS Criminal Investigation Division (CID). Id. at *31-*43. In sum, we held that in the precise situation in Dingman, the CID was an appropriate place to hand-deliver a return. Id. Dingman is applicable only to hand-delivery of returns arising under the facts present in that case.[11]

The Tax Court also notes that, unlike Dingman, in this case the taxpayer continued to take the position it had timely filed the 2001 return.

In Dingman the taxpayer clearly intended that the returns submitted to the CID be delinquent returns with payments, and the IRS processed them as such and assessed the taxpayer's payments. Those facts are not present in the instant case. Indeed, petitioner continues to maintain that Seaview timely filed its 2001 return.[12]

The Tax Court argues that Dingman does not override the regulation in question:

Dingman did not create a blanket rule that a taxpayer can file a return by whatever method he chooses; nor did it create an additional place for taxpayers to file returns beyond the places specifically designated in the Code or the regulations.[13]

The Tax Court also noted that even if such a submission could constitute a filing, what the taxpayer had submitted was not, in the view of the Tax Court, intended to be a tax return, but rather was presented solely as a copy of an already filed return:

The relevant question in this case is whether the purported copy of the return Seaview either faxed to Agent Johnson in 2005 or mailed to respondent’s counsel in 2007 purported to be a return. In Friedman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-207, 2001 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 240, at *5, aff’d, 80 F. App’x 285 (3d Cir. 2003), a revenue agent requested from a taxpayer copies of his returns for 1989 and 1990. The revenue agent believed that the taxpayer filed returns for those years although the taxpayer had not. Id. at *5-*6. The taxpayer provided copies of the returns to the revenue agent but did not tell him that he had failed to file the returns. Id. at *6. And the revenue agent received the returns thinking that they had already been filed. Id. We therefore held, in part, that the taxpayer had not intended his delivery of the documents to constitute the filing of returns. Id. at *24.

The situation in the present case is similar. When Seaview’s accountant faxed a purported copy of the return to Agent Johnson in 2005, he enclosed a copy of certified mail receipt purporting to show that the return had been previously filed in 2002. Seaview’s accountant thus led respondent to believe that the return had been previously filed in 2002. Therefore, Seaview did not intend to file a return when it faxed a copy to Agent Johnson.

Seaview has the same problem with respect to the mailing of the purported copy of the return in 2007. Seaview’s attorney enclosed with the document a cover letter stating that the document was a “copy of its 2001 Form 1065”. This indicates that Seaview believed it had previously filed its return and, thus, Seaview did not intend to file a return when it mailed a copy to respondent’s counsel.[14]

There is one very interesting point to note here—the taxpayer was not, at this point in time, arguing that the 2001 return had been timely filed despite having sent along a certified mail receipt to show the return had been filed in July of 2002.

IRC Section 7502(c) provides:

(c) Registered and certain mailing; electronic filing.

(1) Registered mail. For purposes of this section, if any return, claim, statement, or other document, or payment, is sent by United States registered mail--

(A) such registration shall be prima facie evidence that the return, claim, statement, or other document was delivered to the agency, officer, or office to which addressed; and

(B) the date of registration shall be deemed the postmark date.

(2) Certified mail; electronic filing. The Secretary is authorized to provide by regulations the extent to which the provisions of paragraph (1) with respect to prima facie evidence of delivery and the postmark date shall apply to certified mail and electronic filing.

Reg. §301.7502-1(e)(2) provides the regulations to allow the use of certified mail to give prima facie evidence that the document was delivered to the office to which it was addressed:

(i) Registered and certified mail. In the case of a document (but not a payment) sent by registered or certified mail, proof that the document was properly registered or that a postmarked certified mail sender’s receipt was properly issued and that the envelope was properly addressed to the agency, officer, or office constitutes prima facie evidence that the document was delivered to the agency, officer, or office.

This means that if the taxpayer has a certified mail receipt with a proper postmark and evidence the document was addressed to the Ogden Service Center, the presumption now shifts to the IRS to show that the document was not actually delivered to the IRS—a virtually impossible task.

But the taxpayer did not use this obvious route to show the return was properly mailed and delivered to the Ogden Service Center in July 2002.  Establishing the return had been delivered to the Ogden Service Center would have meant the FPAA had clearly been issued well after the statute had closed.

But at the Tax Court the taxpayer only reserved the right to later argue the return had been timely filed and, by the time the case got to the Ninth Circuit panel, “Seaview concedes that it can’t prove its Form 1065 was ever received by the service center in Ogden.”[15]

Presumably, despite having a certified mailing receipt of some sort, the taxpayer was unable to provide the items required by Reg. §301.7502-1(e)(2) to gain the presumption of delivery to Ogden.  The issues to prove would appear to have been, at a minimum:

  • A certified mailing receipt issued by the U.S. Postal Service (a receipt issued by a UPS Store or similar service that will mail documents for a taxpayer would not be sufficient);

  • The receipt must contain a proper postmark, applied by a USPS employee that contains the date of the mailing, which will be treated as the postmark date under IRC §7502; and

  • The address that the document was addressed to must be able to be shown and it needs to be the proper address to which the return should have been delivered.[16]

Another reason to believe that there was some issue with the certified mail receipt is that the IRS was clearly aware of the existence of this receipt, but still acted as if no return had ever been filed.

Finally, when the Tax Court did not find that the copies represented timely filing, the taxpayer apparently did not go forward with showing it had sufficient information to obtain the presumption that the return had been delivered to the Ogden Service Center in July 2002.  Rather, the taxpayer and IRS settled all other issues and only the question of whether providing the second or third copy of the return represented a filing was taken up with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Unfortunately, since the taxpayer never asked a Court to rule upon the issue of the certified mail proof of filing and eventually simply conceded the issue away, we won’t know what issue prevented the use of the certified mail receipt to resolve the matter.

The Ninth Circuit Majority Opinion

The taxpayer appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the case was heard by a three judge panel.  Two of the judges ruled that the provision of the signed copy of the return to the IRS agent by the partnership was the filing of a proper income tax return which began the running of the statute of limitations, overturning the Tax Court decision.  As that was more than three years before the FPAA was issued, the FPAA had been issued too late.

The opinion finds that the regulations govern only the filing of a timely return:

…[T]he IRS regulations expressly govern the time and place to file timely partnership returns. They must be filed by April 15 following the tax year and, for partnerships with a principal place of business in California, sent to the IRS Service Center in Ogden, Utah. See Form 1065, Instructions. If Seaview was seeking to show a timely filing of its partnership return, it could not do so.[17]

Remember that the taxpayer had, by this time, conceded it could not show the form had been delivered to the Ogden Service Center (nor, it would appear, could it provide the necessary evidence to obtain the prima facie presumption with certified mail).

But the panel argues that the issue before it is not if Seaview timely filed its return, but whether it had properly filed the return late:

The question is whether Seaview belatedly “filed” its tax return by following the instructions of IRS officials and delivering the returns to them.[18]

The majority finds that the regulations don’t govern the question of whether a late return was filed:

Section 1.6031(a)-1(e) doesn’t expressly establish how taxpayers are to file delinquent returns. Nothing in the text says that the time and place requirements apply to untimely returns. Indeed, by definition, if a taxpayer files a return after April 15, the taxpayer can’t comply with § 1.6031(a)- 1(e) since the regulation specifies that date as when the return “must be filed.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.6031(a)-1(e)(2). So, at most, the regulation is silent on filing procedures for late returns.[19]

The majority found no regulation prevented the filing of a tax return with an IRS official who had actually requested the return:

As the IRS itself noted, there is more than one place for a partnership to properly file a return. For example, the law permits partnerships to hand-carry returns to certain IRS offices. See 26 U.S.C. § 6091(b)(4) (2000) (allowing filing by hand-carrying to an appropriate internal revenue district); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6091-2(d)(1) (allowing filing by hand-carrying to “any person assigned the responsibility to receive hand-carried returns in the local Internal Revenue Service office”). So an IRS service center isn’t the only place a partnership can file its returns—even when timely.[20]

The majority argues that the ordinary meaning of filing should be used since the regulations fail to define the term in this context, holding:

Based on the ordinary meaning of “filing,” we hold that a delinquent partnership return is “filed” under § 6229(a) when an IRS official authorized to obtain and process a delinquent return asks a partnership for such a return, the partnership delivers the return to the IRS official in the manner requested, and the IRS official receives the return.[21]

The majority opinion goes on to note that the IRS actually encourages that returns be filed with IRS agents and other employees in various internal IRS guidance (the Internal Revenue Manual, a 2006 IRS Policy Statement and a 1999 Chief Counsel Advice).[22]  The opinion notes that the Chief Counsel Advice[23] states a preference for such returns to be filed with the IRS agent:

What’s more, the memorandum expressed a preference for delinquent returns being filed with IRS officers. Given the costs and delays with sending a return to a service center, the Chief Counsel advised that “it is generally in the taxpayer’s best interest[] to file the delinquent return directly with the revenue officer instead of mailing it to the appropriate Service Center.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 4 n.2. So even the IRS Chief Counsel recognizes that taxpayers can and should file a late return directly with the revenue officer rather than send it to a service center.[24]

The majority, while admitting these documents aren’t necessarily binding on the IRS, uses the documents to buttress support for the idea that even the IRS sees filing as including cases where returns are delivered to IRS agents:

The IRS doesn’t deny that its internal procedures conflict with its current litigation position, but only claims that its internal “procedures are primarily for the benefit of the IRS, not taxpayers.” That may be so, but the point is not whether these internal documents benefit taxpayers. The point is that the IRS’s own directives confirm the plain language of the Tax Code and IRS regulations—that taxpayers may file delinquent returns with authorized officials. And the inconsistency of the IRS’s position is troubling: The IRS wants the ability to direct taxpayers to submit delinquent returns to its authorized officials, while maintaining the power to unilaterally decide whether the returns are “filed” for statute-of-limitations purposes. We reject this nonsensical position and instead follow the ordinary meaning of the Tax Code.[25]

In addressing the dissent the opinion does note that several Tax Court cases support the IRS’s view in this case, as well as noting cases decided outside the Ninth Circuit that held submitting a return to IRS personnel or to the wrong place doesn’t constitute a filing.  But in the out of circuit cases, the panel indicates that the facts aren’t quite the same as the ones in this case, though the panel does not distinguish why these differences would be important and lead to a different decision (or even if they would do so in the majority’s view).

The Dissent

The case comes with a rather lengthy (52 page) dissent that argues the original Tax Court decision was correct, noting:

For many years—indeed, in all its communications with the IRS and in litigating this case before the Tax Court— Seaview maintained that it had filed its 2001 partnership return in 2002, and that it had filed the return to the correct location, the IRS service center in Ogden, Utah.1 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6031(a)-1(e) (2001); IRS, Instructions for Form 1065 at 4 (2001). Now, Seaview acknowledges that it cannot show that its return ever reached the Ogden service center. It is therefore undisputed that Seaview failed to file its return to the correct location, either on time or belatedly. That conclusion should end our inquiry, and we should affirm the Tax Court.[26]

The dissent argues that the majority opinion sought to address what it perceived as an unfairness in the Tax Court’s result:

The majority, however, goes to great lengths to avoid the result that the plain text of the Tax Code and the IRS regulations compel, taking issue with what it sees as the IRS’s “inconsistency.” Maj. Op. 6–7, 16, 19. The majority relies on IRS internal guidance documents to conclude that requiring Seaview to file its partnership return at the time and place designated in the regulations is unfair. Maj. Op. 16–19.[27]

In a footnote, the dissent clarifies this reading of the majority opinion:

To be sure, the majority avoids explicitly complaining that the Tax Code and regulations are “unfair.” But the opening paragraphs of the opinion—in which the majority asks its readers to “imagine” that they, like Seaview, were mistreated when the IRS did not treat unfiled returns as properly filed returns, and laments “How can this be?”—expose the majority’s underlying angst that the filing requirements are unfair. Maj. Op. 6–7.[28]

The dissent goes on to argue that the majority ignores binding law and precedent to achieve its result:

In its attempt to remedy this perceived unfairness, the majority brushes aside all sources of binding and persuasive legal authority. For the majority, it matters little that the Tax Code and regulations specify the mandatory time and place for filing a tax return, 26 U.S.C. § 6230(i) (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6031(a)-1 (2001), and that Seaview never complied with those provisions. Maj. Op. 10–15. And to reach its desired result, the majority disregards Supreme Court precedent holding that taxpayers must meticulously comply with filing requirements to benefit from the statute of limitations, Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 245, 249 (1930), and that we must strictly construe the statute of limitations in favor of the government, Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386 (1984). Maj. Op. 19, 22 n.6. The majority also tramples the overwhelming body of case law from our sister circuits and the Tax Court rejecting the result it reaches. Maj. Op. 20– 21.

The dissent focuses on the fact that Seaview gets the return treated as filed only after failing to timely file the return:

How does the majority manage to sidestep so much binding and persuasive legal authority? In what can only be described as an astonishing and unprecedented holding, the majority decides that because Seaview violated some subsections of the applicable statute and regulation, the remaining provisions do not apply to it. Maj. Op. 13–15 & n.2. In other words, the majority reasons that the parts of the law governing where to file a partnership return do not apply in this case because Seaview did not comply with the parts of the law governing when to file a partnership return. Maj. Op. 13–15 & n.2.

… Under the majority’s sweeping holding, as long as a taxpayer does not comply with the regulatory deadlines for filing a return (or in other words as long as the taxpayer submits a return late), the taxpayer is not subject to the regulation’s other provisions and can “file” its return by sending it to virtually any IRS employee. Maj. Op. 10, 21 & n.4. The majority thus effects a sea change in the interpretation of long-standing, and previously uncontroversial, filing regulations.[29]

So What Do We Make of This

At this point it is important to note that the IRS may yet ask for a rehearing of this decision by a larger panel of the Ninth Circuit.  But assuming the IRS does not do that or the Ninth Circuit declines to have a larger panel hear the case, for now this rule would only appear to be binding in the Ninth Circuit.

It’s also important to note the unique facts of this case.  Our lack of information on why no argument was made regarding the certified mail receipt being prima facie evidence of receipt of the return by the Ogden Service Center is an important missing fact. 

It’s not clear why the IRS was so confident that the certified mail receipt would not meet the requirement of the timely filing regulations that the agency went forward with the exam even though the statute would have just expired if that delivery to Ogden took place. 

Nor is it clear why the taxpayers never put the issue of the certified mail receipt before the Tax Court for a determination, rather going ahead with completing the entire exam and then going to the Court of Appeals to only argue over the question of whether this submission that initially sought to show timely filing now should be counted as an original late filing of the return.

But it probably does suggest that if a taxpayer wishes to begin the running of the statute for a late filed return that the IRS has contacted the client about, it may be best to mail a copy of that return to the appropriate IRS processing center and only provide the agent with a copy and notice that the filed return has been sent to the Service Center even if the IRS agent specifically asks the taxpayer not to send the return to the Service Center but rather give it to him/her. 

The IRS position that there must be strict compliance with the regulations to begin the running of the statute would seem to mandate sending all such returns to the Service Center.

[1] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2019-122, September 19, 2019

[2] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022, https://www.taxnotes.com/research/federal/court-documents/court-opinions-and-orders/ninth-circuit-holds-return-was-filed%2c-irs-adjustments-untimely/7dh1s (retrieved May 12, 2022)

[3] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[4] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[5] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[6] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[7] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[8] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[9] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2019-122, September 19, 2019

[10] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2019-122, September 19, 2019

[11] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2019-122, September 19, 2019

[12] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2019-122, September 19, 2019

[13] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2019-122, September 19, 2019

[14] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2019-122, September 19, 2019

[15] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[16] Reg. §301.7502-1(e)(2)

[17] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[18] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[19] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[20] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[21] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[22] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[23] Chief Counsel Advice No. 199933039, Filing Delinquent Returns Directly With Revenue Officers, August 20, 1999

[24] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[25] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, May 11, 2022

[26] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, Dissent, May 11, 2022

[27] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, Dissent, May 11, 2022

[28] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, Dissent, May 11, 2022

[29] Seaview Trading LLC v. Commissioner, CA9, Case No. 20-72416, Dissent, May 11, 2022